Abstract. In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra-and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms 'as consistently as possible'.
Introduction
The development of systems capable of tolerating conflicting norms is considered an important challenge in the fields of deontic logic [14] and normative multiagent systems [7] . In this paper, we try to meet this challenge by consistently allowing for various types of normative conflicts within a non-classical multiagent framework, i.e. a multi-agent framework that invalidates some rules and theorems of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL).
For reasons of presentation we will first introduce a classical variant of the framework (Section 2), and illustrate how the resulting logic MDC treats individual and collective obligations. Next, we present a subdivision of various types of normative conflicts (Section 3), and show that MDC cannot consistently allow for the possibility of such conflicts.
In order to prevent instances of normative conflicts from giving rise to deontic explosion, we introduce a paraconsistent variant of the logic MDC: the logic MDP (Section 4). As opposed to MDC, MDP can consistently deal with any type of normative conflict. However, the conflict-tolerance of MDP comes at a price. Since MDP gives up some of the rules validated by SDL (and hence by MDC), it loses much of the latter system's inferential power. This drawback is common to any monotonic paraconsistent deontic logic presented so far (Section 5).
The solution to this problem presented here consists of extending MDP within the adaptive logics framework [4] . In the resulting logic (called MDP m ), some MDC-inferences are made conditional upon the behavior of the premises: MDP m verifies only those inferences which rely on premises that can safely be assumed to behave 'normally'. The technically precise sense in which MDP m does so is spelled out in Section 6. MDP m has the nice property that for premise sets all members of which behave 'normally' in this sense, MDP m delivers the same consequences as MDC.
2 A simple classical multi-agent framework
Language
We use a denumerable set W a of propositional constants (atoms) p, q, r, . . .. The ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃, ≡ -closure of W a is denoted by W. We call formulas in W (purely) propositional formulas.
Next to propositional formulas, we use a finite set I = {i 1 , . . . , i n } of agents. We will in the remainder often refer to groups of agents J in I, i.e. non-empty subsets of I. The following notation is useful for this: J ⊆ ∅ I iff J = ∅ and J ⊆ I. The set W I = { A, J | A ∈ W, J ⊆ ∅ I} denotes the set of agentproposition pairs. Throughout the paper, we will use "A J " as a shortcut for " A, J ." Where i ∈ I, we will in the remainder of the paper abbreviate A {i} by A i . A formula A J ∈ W I is translated as "group J brings about A by a joint effort". We will discuss and distinguish this notion from another, weaker reading of group obligations in Section 2.3. W c I is the set of all formulas in the ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃ , ≡ -closure of W I . Where W l denotes the set of literals (i.e. the set of atoms in W a and their negations), we also define the set W l I = {A J | A ∈ W l , J ⊆ ∅ I} of agent-literal complexes. Finally, the set W c of well-defined formulas for the classical multi-agent framework is defined recursively as follows:
There is another subtlety worth pointing out, namely the difference between O¬(A i ) and O(¬A) i . While the latter indicates i's obligation to bring about ¬A, the former is literally read as "It ought to be that it is not the case that i brings about A". This can be understood as i's obligation to refrain from bringing about A.
The logic MDC
In this section we present a classical system for modeling normative reasoning. We presuppose that (i) norms dealt with by this system arise from the same source, and (ii) agents have epistemic access to all norms issued by this source.
Let us demonstrate how to adjust the Kripke-frames that are usually used in order to semantically characterize SDL to the multi-agent setting of MDC. We shortly outline some of the basic ideas. An SDL-model is a tuple M = W, R, v, w 0 . W is a set of worlds where each world is associated with a set of atoms by the assignment function v : W a → ℘(W ). A propositional atom A is said to hold in a world w iff it is assigned to the world by v, i.e. w ∈ v(A). The validity of complex formulas is then recursively defined as usual. R ⊆ W × W is a serial accessibility relation. A formula A is obliged in a world w iff it is valid in all the accessible worlds of w. Moreover, w 0 ∈ W is the so-called actual world. Let us now step-by-step generalize these frames for the multi-agent setting. First we need to introduce agents. We represent them by a finite non-empty set I = {i 1 , . . . , i n }. An MDC-model is a tuple M = W, I, R, v, v I , w 0 where as before W is a set of worlds, R ⊆ W × W is a serial accessibility relation, v : W a → ℘(W ) is an assignment function, and w 0 ∈ W is the actual world. Just as before, the idea is that the propositional atom A is the case in w iff w ∈ v(A).
We are not only interested in what is the case in our worlds, but also in causation, more precisely the question which agents cause certain events. In order to express this, our worlds are not just points, such as in the case of the SDL-semantics, but they are structured. Every world w ∈ W is associated with tuples w, J , for all J ⊆ ∅ I. We use w J as a shortcut for w, J .
While in SDL the assignment v associates a world w ∈ W with atoms in order to express what atoms hold in w, we add now an additional assignment v I that associates each w J with literals in order to express what literals are brought about by the group of agents J. The idea is that a literal A is brought about in w by a group of agents J iff w J ∈ v(A). Hence,
. v associates only atoms (and not literals) with worlds because this provides enough information to uniquely define whether a complex propositional formula representing factual information holds in a world. We for instance do not need to assign worlds to negated propositional atoms such as ¬A, since by means of a semantic clause such as the following it can be determined whether ¬A holds in a world w: ( †) "¬A holds in w in a model M iff A does not hold in w in M ". Note that, in order to determine whether J brings about ¬A in w, we cannot rely on the fact that J does not bring about A. After all, from the fact that J refrains from bringing about A we cannot infer that J brings about ¬A. The fact that A or ¬A holds in a world may be independent of actions by J. Hence, we need to specify for each literal by what group of agents it is brought about (if any).
In the SDL-semantics the clause ( †) ensures that the worlds are consistent in the sense that it is not the case that for an atom A, A holds in a world w and at the same time ¬A holds in the world w. Since v I associates worlds with both atoms and their negations we need to ensure the consistency by a frame-condition: F-Con For all A ∈ W a , for all w ∈ W , and for all J, K ⊆ ∅ I:
Moreover, we want to ensure that whenever an agent or group brings about A, then A is also the case (factually). This is guaranteed by adding the following frame condition:
The valuation v M : W c → W associated with the model M is defined by:
where
is an MDC-model and M MDC A for all A ∈ Γ . Moreover, |= MDC A iff all MDC-models verify A, and Γ |= MDC A iff all MDC-models of Γ verify A.
All of the following inferences are valid in MDC (where A, B ∈ W
More on group obligations
Where i, j ∈ I, the formula OA {i,j} abbreviates a collective obligation for group {i, j} to bring about A. Note that none of OA i , OA j , OA i ∨ OA j , and O(A i ∨ A j ) is MDC-derivable from OA {i,j} . This is due to the fact that OA {i,j} expresses that i and j should bring about A by a joint effort. Collective obligations of this kind are called strict collective obligations by Dignum & Royakkers [11] . A strict collective obligation to bring about A is satisfied only if all agents in the collective bring about A together.
Not all collective obligations are strict collective obligations. Suppose, for instance, that a mother of three children orders her offspring to do the dishes. In order to satisfy this obligation, it might not matter if only one or two of the children actually do the dishes. All that matters is that, in the end, the dishes are clean. The obligation issued by this agent is hence not a strict collective obligation. It is what Dignum & Royakkers call a weak collective obligation. A weak collective obligation to bring about A is satisfied as soon as any subset of the collective brings about A.
Although the formula OA J is in MDC interpreted as a strict collective obligation, we can also define an obligation operator O w in order to express weak collective obligations:
The weak collective obligation operator O w captures the intended meaning that if a group of agents ought to bring about a certain state of affairs, then this state of affairs ought to be brought about by some subset of the group. 1 It follows immediately by the definition and C I ∨ that |= MP OA J ⊃ O w A J . Obviously, if the group J faces the strict collective obligation to bring about A, then some subgroup of J -namely J itself-has to bring about A. Note that O w A i = OA i . The disambiguation of the notion of collective obligation by means of the distinction between strict and weak collective obligations allows us to further illustrate some subtle differences in MDC. Suppose that some agent i ought to bring about ¬A, whereas agents i and j ought to bring about A ∨ B. If the latter obligation is interpreted as a strict collective obligation, then it is MDCderivable that i and j share the strict collective obligation to bring about B:
The O w -operator as defined here is slightly different from the one defined by Dignum & Royakkers in [11] . We write the latter operator as Ow. Then OwAJ = df
We prefer to define weak obligation in terms of O w instead of Ow because we take a weak (collective) obligation to be a single norm rather than a disjunction of norms.
In general, if some group faces a strict collective obligation, then it should try to satisfy this obligation in a way that conflicting obligations are avoided whenever possible. This is exactly what happens in the above example.
If we interpret i and j's obligation to bring about A ∨ B as a weak collective obligation, then OB {i,j} is no longer MDC-derivable, but the weaker obligation O w B {i,j} is:
Again, conflicting obligations are neatly avoided: i and j's weak obligation to bring about A ∨ B is satisfied in a consistent way whenever i, j, or i and j together bring about B.
If instead of supposing that i has the obligation to bring about ¬A, we suppose that i merely has the obligation to refrain from bringing about A, the above reasoning no longer applies:
That i ought to refrain from bringing about A, does not entail that the group {i, j} ought to do so.
2 Hence there is no strict obligation for {i, j} to bring about B. In the variant for weak collective obligation, a similar reasoning applies:
That i should refrain from bringing about A does not allow us to derive a weak collective obligation for i and j to bring about B, because O w (A ∨ B) {i,j} is also satisfied if, for instance, j brings about A or if i and j together (in the strict sense) bring about A.
Normative conflicts
In single-agent settings, normative conflicts (moral conflicts, deontic conflicts) are usually conceived as situations in which an agent has two (or more) conflicting obligations. In the language of MDC, such intra-agent conflicts between obligations can have two logical forms. Where the agent in question is represented by the subscript i, we say that i faces an obligation-obligation conflict (in short, an OO-conflict) if, for some A, either
In the first case, i has both an obligation to bring about A and an obligation to bring about ¬A. In the second case, i has both an obligation to bring about A and an obligation to refrain from bringing about A. Similarly, a group of agents
In a multi-agent setting, we have to allow for the possibility of inter-agent conflicts next to intra-agent conflicts. Conflicts of obligations between different (groups of) agents can arise only in case one of the agents or groups, say J, has to bring about a state of the world inconsistent with a state of the world that should be brought about by another agent or group, say K, i.e. if OA J ∧O(¬A) K .
Note that if J = K, a formula OA J ∧ O¬(A K ) no longer guarantees a conflict of obligations in the multi-agent setting: it is perfectly possible that agent or group J brings about A, while another agent or group K refrains from bringing about A. Altogether, in a multi-agent framework an OO-conflict has one of the following two logical forms:
Logicians often limit their study of normative conflicts to conflicts between two or more obligations, e.g. [13, 15, 17, 18, 25] . However, other types of normative conflicts can occur. It might, for instance, be the case that an agent or group J ought to bring about A, while J is also permitted to refrain from doing so, i.e. OA J ∧ P¬(A J ). Moreover, J might have the obligation to bring about A while a possibly different group or agent K is permitted to bring about ¬A, i.e. OA J ∧P(¬A) K . In what follows such conflicts will be called obligation-permission conflicts or OP-conflicts. For some examples of OP-conflicts in a single-agent setting, see [6, 30] . The possibility of OP-conflicts was also defended in [1, 2, 8, 35] .
In [6, 24] examples were given of contradicting norms. Suppose, for instance, that in some country the constitution contains the following clauses concerning parliamentary elections: (i) it is not the case that women are permitted to vote, and (ii) property holders are permitted to vote. Suppose further that (possibly due to a recent revision of the property law) women are allowed to hold property. Then the law is inconsistent: any female property holder i is both permitted and not permitted to vote:
The same reasoning holds, of course, for formulas of the form OA ∧ ¬OA (where A ∈ W c I ). As hinted at above, normative conflicts of the type PA ∧ ¬PA or OA ∧ ¬OA are called contradicting norms.
Next to contradicting norms, i.e. different norms that contradict each other, one might also face a contradictory norm, i.e. a norm that contradicts itself. A contradictory norm is of the form O(
For a defense of contradictory norms, we refer to [24] .
Unfortunately, none of the types of normative conflicts presented above can be dealt with consistently by the logic MDC. MDC trivializes all instances of all types of normative conflicts. This gives rise to what is usually called deontic explosion: the fact that from a deontic conflict any obligation follows. See [13, 30] for a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon in deontic logic. An oversight of the various types of normative conflicts and their accompanying principles of deontic explosion is provided in the table below. Where A ∈ W and B, C ∈ W c I :
Since MDC causes explosion when faced with a normative conflict, and since we want to allow for the consistent possibility of normative conflicts, we need a logic that is weaker than MDC. 3 The situation is analogous in non-agentive settings. There too, SDL gives rise to explosion in view of formulas of the form OA ∧ O¬A, OA ∧ P¬A, etc. And there too, authors have suggested weakening the logic in order to tolerate normative conflicts; for some examples, see [12, 21, 25, 28, 31, 32] . A good oversight can be found in [13] .
The solution presented here is to replace the classical negation operator by a weaker negation operator that renders invalid the Ex Contradictione Quodlibet principle (ECQ), i.e. A ∧ ¬A |= B. One of the main reasons for invalidating ECQ in deontic logic is that it is the only possible solution for consistently allowing for contradicting norms.
Logics that invalidate ECQ are usually called paraconsistent logics. In a single-agent deontic setting, paraconsistent deontic logics have been presented in [6, 10, 24] . To the best of our knowledge, this solution was never before used in a multi-agent deontic setting.
The logic obtained by replacing the classical negation of MDC by a weaker, paraconsistent negation is called MDP. Since we want MDP to invalidate all explosion principles from the table in Section 3, frame condition F-Con must be given up. In MDC, F-Con excludes accessible worlds which validate both A J and (¬A) K for some J and K. Hence this condition immediately trivializes e.g. normative conflicts of the form OA J ∧ O(¬A) K or OA J ∧ P(¬A) K . Thus if we want to consistently allow for all types of normative conflicts, F-Con must be rejected.
Giving up F-Con takes us one step closer towards a conflict-tolerant deontic logic. However, even if F-Con is rejected, triviality still ensues in view of e.g. conflicts of the form OA J ∧O¬(A J ) or OA J ∧P¬(A J ). Hence more work is needed in order to make the new logic fully conflict-tolerant, i.e. in order to invalidate all explosion principles stated for MDC in the table in Section 3.
Analogous to MDC-models, MDP-models are tuples W, I, R, v, v I , w 0 . The only difference is that the factual assignment v is now defined more broadly, i.e. v :
Moreover we remove the MDC-frame condition F-Con, and replace F-Fac with F-Fac :
3 Some authors circumnavigate the problems posed by normative conflicts by making their formal system more expressive rather than by weakening its axioms or rules. For instance, in [18] Kooi & Tamminga add super-and subscripts to the deontic operators in order to express the source and the interest group in view of which a norm holds. However, in their system explosion still ensues when faced with conflicting norms that hold for the same source and interest group. Such 'hardcore' normative conflicts are sometimes called symmetrical conflicts [20, 27] . In order to consistently allow for the possibility of these conflicts in deontic logic, we need a non-standard formalism, i.e. a formalism that invalidates one or more of the theorems and rules of SDL. 4 The negation of MDP is that of the paraconsistent logic CLuNs as found in e.g. [3, 5] . MDP allows for both A J and ¬(A J ) to be true at one and the same accessible world. Consequently, this logic can consistently model situations in which for an agent or group J it ought to be that J brings about A and that J refrains from bringing about A. In general, for any A ∈ W c , MDP allows for both A and ¬A to be true at one and the same accessible world. This is exactly what we need if we also want to consistently allow for the possibility of contradicting norms.
F-Fac
Altogether, the paraconsistent multi-agent deontic logic MDP is fully conflicttolerant (where A ∈ W, and B, C ∈ W c I ): 
inconsistent worlds are accessible from the actual world, i.e. worlds in which both D f and (¬D) f are true (and, consequently, in which both D and ¬D are true). In these worlds, W f may be false while the premises are true. In contrast, all the MDC-models of our premise set Γ 1 are such that all the accessible worlds are consistent and verify (D ∨ W ) f , (¬D) f and hence W f . This is the reason why Γ 1 |= MDC OW f while Γ 1 |= MDP OW f . Obviously our premise set is not conflicting. In such cases we would ideally expect from any deontic logic that its models do not verify normative conflicts. Hence, in our case we are interested in MDP-models that -just like the MDC-models-do not validate D f ∧ (¬D) f in any of the accessible worlds, i.e. models M for which
It is easy to see that all these models validate W f in all the accessible worlds, just like the MDC-models. In other words, since
we get OW f by selecting models that do not validate any normative conflicts.
The solution offered above is obviously not working as soon as we have to deal with conflicting premise sets. Suppose Frank invited his aunt Maggie for a cup of coffee and cookies in the afternoon. However, his other aunt Beth is an awfully jealous person: she would be deeply insulted if she's not also invited. Hence Frank has the obligation to also invite Beth (OB f ). On the other hand, Maggie cannot stand Beth (she's a rather difficult person) and whenever they are together all hell breaks loose. Thus, Frank should make sure that Beth is not invited (O(¬B) f ). Let Γ 2 = Γ 1 ∪ {OB f , O(¬B) f }. While MDC trivializes Γ 2 , MDP does not trivialize Γ 2 but is again too weak. For the same reason as above, Γ 2 |= MDP OW f . However, in contrast to above we cannot now simply select models whose worlds are consistent since there are no such models. Indeed, all models of Γ 2 are such that in all accessible worlds B f and (¬B) f are valid. In other words, all models validate O(B f ∧ (¬B) f ). But, similar to above, the idea is to not take into consideration models that validate
In a nutshell the idea is to strengthen MDP by selecting models whose accessible worlds are "as non-conflicting as possible". This idea will be realized by means of the adaptive logic MDP m . Before we introduce this logic in Section 6, let us focus on some other weaknesses of MDP. For instance, all of the following inferences are invalid in MDP, for the same reason why OW f is not MDP-derivable from O(D ∨ W ) f and O(¬D) f : because of the possibility of contradictions being true in accessible worlds in MDP-models. 5 Where A, B ∈ W, and C, D ∈ W c :
Items (1) and (2) represent deontic variants of Disjunctive Syllogism, (3)-(6) represent variants of the interdefinability between obligations and permissions, (7) is the propositional version of Disjunctive Syllogism, and (8) is Contraposition. In contrast, the following inferences are valid in MDP.
In items (1')-(8'), all formulas on the right-hand side of the "∨"-sign represent normative conflicts. As in our example above, interpreting premise sets as non-conflicting as possible will validate the deontic and propositional versions of Disjunctive Syllogism, the interdefinability between obligations and permissions, and Contraposition as much as possible. Indeed, given that the normative conflicts on the right-hand side of "∨" are false in (1')-(8'), the left-hand disjuncts must be true. 6 The adaptive logic MDP m Adaptive logics are characterized by means of a triple consisting of a lower limit logic (henceforth LLL), a set of abnormalities Ω, and an adaptive strategy. 6 The LLL constitutes the stable part of an adaptive logic: everything that is LLLderivable from a given set of premises, is still derivable by means of the adaptive logic. Formulating adaptive logics in the standard format has the advantage that a rich meta-theory is immediately available for this format [4] . Although adaptive logics come with an attractive dynamic proof theory we will for the sake of conciseness focus in this paper exclusively on the semantics.
Typically, an adaptive logic enables one to derive, for most premise sets, some extra consequences on top of those that are LLL-derivable. These supple-mentary consequences are obtained by interpreting a premise set "as normally as possible". The exact interpretation of this idea depends on the adaptive strategy which defines which models of the LLL are selected.
7 For our present purposes, we shall use the Minimal Abnormality strategy. The logic MDP m is characterized by:
(1) LLL: MDP (2) Set of abnormalities:
By (1) we make sure that we select MDP-models. This ensures that MDP m inherits the conflict-tolerance from MDP.
As mentioned, adaptive logics interpret premise sets in a way that as few abnormalities as possible are verified. The attentive reader will have noticed that not all conflict-types that were listed in the table in Section 3 occur in Ω. This is justified due to the fact that all other conflict-types give rise to abnormalities in Ω, as the following table shows (where A ∈ W, and B, C ∈ W c I ) 8 :
For our semantic selection we will make use of the notion of the abnormal part of an MDP-model, i.e. the set of all abnormalities verified by it: Ab(M ) = {A ∈ Ω | M MDP A}. The Minimal Abnormality strategy selects all MDP-models of a premise set Γ which have a minimal abnormal part (w.r.t. set-inclusion).
The semantic consequence relation of the logic MDP m is defined by selecting the minimally abnormal MDP-models: Definition 2. Γ |= MDP m A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal MDPmodels of Γ .
The fact that the set of MDP m -models of Γ is a subset of the set of MDPmodels of Γ immediately ensures that MDP m strengthens MDP.
For an illustration of the logic, let's return to the example presented in Section 5. Remember that
No abnormality A ∈ Ω is an MDP-consequence of Γ 1 , hence there are MDPmodels M of Γ 1 such that Ab(M ) = ∅. By Definition 1, these and only these are the minimal abnormal models of Γ 1 . It follows that, for all minimal abnormal models M of
By the same reasoning as applied in the example above, we can show that all of (1")-(8") below are MDP m -valid in view of the MDP-validity of (1')-(8') as displayed in Section 5: 
The following theorem shows that for any MDC-consistent premise set the MDP m -consequences are identical to the MDC-consequences:
A proof of Theorem 2 is contained in the Appendix. Note that (1")-(8") immediately follow as a corollary to Theorem 2. If all MDP-models of given a premise set verify at least one abnormality, then MDP m is still considerably stronger than MDP. Consider the premise set Γ 2 from Section 5, where we enriched Γ 1 with the conflicting obligations concerning the invitation of aunt Beth, OB f and O(¬B) f . Here too, Frank's obligation to open the window is an MDP m -consequence: Γ 2 |= MDP m OW f . Although there are no models of Γ 2 that have an empty abnormal part since all models validate the abnormality P(B f ∧ (¬B) f ), the minimal abnormal models do not validate P(D f ∧ (¬D) f ) (as the reader can easily verify).
Imagine now that we add to Γ 2 the premise O(¬W ) f , which abbreviates Frank's obligation to take care that the window remains closed (e.g. because it was painted recently and the paint is not dry yet). Let us call this extended premise set Γ 3 . Then Γ 3 |= MDP P(D f ∧ (¬D) f ) ∨ P(W f ∧ (¬W ) f ). Consequently, all minimally abnormal MDP-models M of Γ 3 verify at least one of P(D f ∧ (¬D) f ) and P(W f ∧ (¬W ) f ). Γ 3 has minimally abnormal MDP-models which verify P(D f ∧ (¬D) f ). Since it is no longer the case that, for all minimally abnormal MDP-models M of Γ 3 , M MDP P(D f ∧ (¬D) f ), for these models it no longer follows that M MDP OW f . Hence For the proof of Theorem 3, we refer to [4] . Proof. Since obviously {B | Γ |= MDP m B} |= MDP m A for all A ∈ Γ , this is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4 (where Γ = {B | Γ |= MDP m B}). 9 In [4] , the strong reassurance property is proven for logics that fit the so-called standard format for adaptive logics. In order for the proof for strong reassurance from [4] to work, MDP m needs to contain all classical connectives. MDP m can easily be adjusted to do so by adding the constant false symbol "⊥" to its language, and by defining a classical negation connective "∼" as ∼ A = df A ⊃ ⊥.
